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Free trade, or Freihandel, was a hot-button issue at the German Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) Congress held in Stuttgart in 1898, most notably because of the policy’s 
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numerous advocates. SPD leader Karl Kautsky kicked things off with a resolution 
denouncing protectionism for counteracting ‘international solidarity.’ Luise Zietz, a 
German feminist and head of the SPD women’s movement, seconded Kautsky’s call: 
‘We have to adopt a principled stance, and that is in favor of free trade and against 
protective tariffs.’ August Bebel, SPD chairman and longtime pacifist, followed up 
on Kautsky and Zietz’s free-trade endorsements, and the congress adopted a qualified 
resolution along these lines. Free trade would receive an even stronger SPD 
endorsement in 1900 because ‘free international exchange is . . . before all, a 
working-class question,’ German Marxist revisionist Eduard Bernstein explained in a 
subsequent letter to London’s 1908 International Free Trade Congress.1 Their efforts 
were part of a rich socialist free-trade tradition that began germinating when Friedrich 
Engels and Karl Marx migrated to Britain in the 1840s, just as the island-nation was 
embracing free trade as both policy and ideology. The same British free-trade 
embrace was also giving rise at this time to the Manchester School (Manchester 
liberalism, Cobdenism), an economic ideology that tied international trade 
liberalization together with cheap food, democratization, anti-imperialism, and peace 
– a cosmopolitan concoction that socialist internationalists increasingly imbibed by 
the turn of the century.2   
Recovering the free-trade dimensions of socialist internationalism, and the 
pacific influence of Britain’s Manchester School upon it, upends the commonly held 
assumption that socialists the world over have supported nationalism and 
                                                        
1 Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, 
Stuttgart (Berlin, 1898), 68, 200; Carlton J. H. Hayes, ‘The History of German Socialism 
Reconsidered’, American Historical Review 23 (1917), 93-94; Cornelius Torp, The Challenges of 
Globalization: Economy and Politics in Germany, 1860-1914 (New York, 2014), 248; Report of the 
Proceedings of the International Free Trade Congress, London, August, 1908 (London, 1908), 28.  
2 On the long-term role of Manchester School ideology within Britain and its empire, see especially 
William Dyer Grampp, The Manchester School of Economics (Stanford, 1960); Anthony Howe, Free 
Trade and Liberal England, 1846-1946 (Oxford, 1997); Frank Trentmann, Free Trade Nation: 
Commerce, Consumption, and Civil Society in Modern Britain (Oxford, 2008). 
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protectionism amid their collectivist opposition to free-market capitalism.3 Doing so 
also provides a much-needed prehistory to the growing body of literature on ‘socialist 
globalization’. This scholarship has focused primarily on socialist attempts to deepen 
regional and global interdependence through market integration and supranational 
governance amid the Manichean ideological divide of the Cold War.4  By contrast, 
earlier attempts have received far less attention, and the role of free trade within the 
socialist internationalist tradition less still. As a partial corrective, this article traces 
the evolution of socialist internationalist support for free trade across the century 
before the Cold War, wherein the cosmopolitan subscription to free trade increasingly 
made strange bedfellows among those capitalists and socialists seeking a more 
interdependent and peaceful world order.  
The global turn to economic nationalism from the late nineteenth century to 
the Second World War played a crucial role in aligning the ideological schools of 
Marx and Manchester. By the 1860s and 1870s, many industrializing capitalist states 
– most prominent among them the United States and Germany — embraced policies 
of ‘infant industrial’ protectionism and went in search of new colonial markets among 
the underdeveloped regions of Africa, Latin America, and the Asia Pacific.5 The 
close connection between these protectionist and imperial developments helped spark 
the growth of socialist theories of imperialism and socialist free-trade-and-peace 
                                                        
3 See, for example, Friedrich Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago, 1948), 270-71; 
Michael A. Heilperin, Studies in Economic Nationalism (Paris, 1960), 43.  
4 See, for instance, Humanity’s Spring 2015 special issue ‘Toward a History of the New International 
Economic Order’; Oscar Sanchez-Sibony, Red Globalization: The Political Economy of the Soviet 
Cold War from Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, 2014); Johanna Bockman, Markets in the Name of 
Socialism: The Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism (Stanford, 2011); James Mark, Bogdan Iacob, 
Tobias Rupprecht, and Ljubica Spaskovska, 1989: A Global History of Eastern Europe (Cambridge, 
2019). 
5 See, et al., Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical 
Perspective (London, 2002); Henryk Szlajfer, Economic Nationalism and Globalization, trans. by 
Maria Chmielewska-Szlajfer (Leiden, 2012). 
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activism.6 After the First World War, an even stronger global swing towards 
economic nationalism and imperial retrenchment encouraged the widespread socialist 
internationalist backing of capitalist supranational initiatives like the League of 
Nations and European union in the hopes of facilitating free trade, decolonization, 
and world peace.7  
Until now, socialist internationalist sympathy for free trade and its close 
association with anti-imperialism and peace in the century before the Cold War has 
yet to be collectively examined. Doing so uncovers how this socialist internationalist 
free-trade tradition evolved alongside and drew inspiration from the Manchester 
School of economic liberalism. Of course, as with any intellectual tradition, socialist 
internationalist support for free trade was not static. Turn-of-the-century Marxist 
theorists of imperialism began reformulating Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’s mid-
nineteenth-century free-trade endorsement. Socialist internationalists during and after 
the First World War increasingly advocated for free trade as a necessary precondition 
for a more peaceful world order — an ideological marriage that the Manchester 
School had so famously wedded together in the 1840s.  
 
I. Marx, Engels, and the Manchester School 
 
                                                        
6 Bert F. Hoselitz, ‘Socialism, Communism, and International Trade’, Journal of Political Economy 57 
(1949), 227-241; Michael Howard and John Edward King, A History of Marxian Economics, Volume 
I, 1883-1929 (Princeton, 1989), 90-92; Pranab Bardhan, ‘Marxist Ideas in Development Economics: A 
Brief Evaluation’, Economic and Political Weekly 20 (30 March 1985), 550; Claudio Katz (trans. by 
Carlos Perez), ‘The Manifesto and Globalization’, Latin American Perspectives 28 (2001), 7-8; Bill 
Dunn, Neither Free Trade Nor Protection: A Critical Political Economy of Trade Theory and Practice 
(Cheltenham, 2015), chap. 5. 
7 This line of thought bore more than a few similarities to that of their interwar ‘neoliberal’ 
contemporaries. See, for instance, Ben Jackson, ‘At the Origins of Neo-Liberalism: The Free Economy 
and the Strong State, 1930-1947’, Historical Journal 53 (March 2010): 129-151; Quinn Slobodian, 
Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (Cambridge, MA, 2018). 
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The socialist free-trade tradition began taking shape in the 1840s, just as Britain 
unilaterally abandoned protectionism following a prolonged grassroots free-trade 
campaign centered in Manchester. The island-nation’s political and ideological shift 
to free trade sparked a brief transatlantic flirtation with trade liberalization.8 This was 
due in no small part to the transnational influence and activism of Britain’s 
Manchester School, which asserted that free-trade internationalism wrought a 
panoply of cheap food, democratization, anti-imperialism, and peace.9 Free trade 
appealed to the cosmopolitan’s ideological and material interests alike by promising 
to feed the world’s poor with cheap food and to undermine the militant political 
influence of atavistic landed elites. This one-two punch would, free traders promised, 
result in global interdependence, political enfranchisement, prosperity, and 
geopolitical amity. As Richard Cobden (1804-1865), the mid-nineteenth-century 
leader of the Manchester School, outlined in a January 1846 speech to the thousands 
of supporters packed inside Manchester’s Free Trade Hall, ‘I see in the Free-trade 
principle that which shall act on the moral world as the principle of gravitation in the 
universe,--drawing men together, thrusting aside the antagonism of race, and creed, 
and language, and uniting us in the bonds of eternal peace.’ As a result, his envisaged 
interdependent economic order would also undermine imperialism and militarism by 
eliminating ‘the desire and the motive for large and mighty empires; for gigantic 
                                                        
8 C. P. Kindleberger, ‘The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe, 1820-1875’, Journal of Economic 
History 35 (March 1975): 20-55; Scott C. James and David A. Lake, ‘The Second Face of Hegemony: 
Britain’s Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846’, International 
Organization 43 (Winter 1989): 1-29. 
9 On the transnational spread of Manchester School ideas, see Howe, Free Trade and Liberal England; 
Anthony Howe and Simon Morgan, eds., Rethinking Nineteenth-Century Liberalism: Richard Cobden 
Bicentenary Essays (Burlington, VT, 2006); Marc-William Palen, The ‘Conspiracy’ of Free Trade: 
The Anglo-American Struggle over Empire and Economic Globalisation, 1846-1896 (Cambridge, 
2016). 
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armies and great navies.’10 Cobden’s pacific free-trade vision briefly found a 
receptive mid-nineteenth-century transatlantic audience. 
Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895), based in England 
from the 1840s onwards, observed this shift from protectionism to free trade in 
Britain and some of the other Western capitalist states – and they gave it their 
qualified endorsement.11 Marx and Engels viewed the international turn to free trade 
as an advancement of the global capitalist project, the dawn of a new epoch of 
capitalist internationalism. For Marx, free trade was a progressive condition of 
industrial capitalism, moving it a step closer to socialist revolution. Protectionism, by 
contrast, was regressive and belonged to the pre- and proto-industrial capitalist era.12 
For Marx’s close friend and patron Friedrich Engels, too, free trade was preferable to 
protectionism as the former would ‘expand as freely and as quickly as possible’ the 
capitalist system and thus hasten the destruction of ‘the whole system.’13 Marx, soon 
before his relocation to Britain in the 1840s, also presaged subsequent twentieth-
century socialist free-trade support for supranational governance. Noting the 
centuries-long regressive political influence of British protectionist elites, Marx 
speculated that ‘only by a congress of nations’ would free traders be able to surmount 
national protectionist tendencies.14 Thus by the time Marx and Engels were 
                                                        
10 Richard Cobden, Speeches on Questions of Public Policy, Vol. 1, ed. by John Bright and James E. 
Thorold Rogers (London, 1870), 362-363. 
11 Debates surrounding ‘material interests’ in early-1840s Germany informed Marx’s later free-trade 
position. Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Chicago, 1904 [1859]), 10. 
12 On the Irish exception, see Marx to Engels, 30 Nov. 1867, reprinted in Karl Marx and Frederick 
Engels: Selected Correspondence, 1846-1895 (New York, 1942), 229. 
13 Reza Ghorashi, ‘Marx on Free Trade’, Science & Society 59 (Spring 1995), 43; Howard and King, A 
History of Marxian Economics, Vol. 1, 15; Samuel Hollander, The Economics of Karl Marx: Analysis 
and Application, 445-446; Hollander, Friedrich Engels and Marxian Political Economy (Cambridge, 
2011), 132-134, 233, 275, 359-361; Friedrich Engels, preface to Karl Marx, On the Question of Free 
Trade (1888), Marx & Engels Collected Works [MECW] vol. 25, 521; Bert F. Hoselitz, ‘Socialism, 
Communism, and International Trade’, Journal of Political Economy 57 (June 1949), 233. 
14 Karl Marx, ‘The Industrialists of Hanover and Protective Tariffs’, (22 Nov. 1842), MECW Vol. 1, 
286. 
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headquartered in ‘Free Trade England,’ they began anticipating, as Claudio Katz puts 
it, ‘the present process of globalization’ through their ‘descriptions of the creation of 
a world market, economic cosmopolitanism, the universal extension of commercial 
rules, and the destruction of tariff barriers.’15  
The mid-century hegemonic rise of Manchester liberalism in Britain informed 
Marx and Engels’s free-trade sympathies. This should not be all that surprising 
considering that both men spent most of their lives in England from the 1840s 
onward. Engels himself claimed to have heard the leaders of the Anti-Corn Law 
League (ACLL, 1839-1846) — Britain’s main free-trade pressure group that Cobden 
spearheaded — ‘pour forth their Anti-Corn-Law arguments more than a hundred 
times’ following Engels’s arrival in Manchester. He and Marx also predicted that the 
ACLL’s efforts would have the added benefit of bringing down the landed 
aristocracy, thereby providing a much-needed boon to English tenant farmers.16 So, 
too, did Marx and Engels’s connecting of protectionism with the rise of monopolies, 
trusts, and geopolitical tensions contain more than a few of the internationalist 
trappings of the Manchester School. 
But while Marx and Engels may have shared a similar distaste for 
protectionism, unlike the Manchester School they did not consider free trade free of 
sin. Neither man believed that free trade was a true friend of the proletariat. They 
assumed that cheaper prices wrought from free trade also meant lower wages for the 
workingman and that the free market’s boom-bust economic cycle and 
overproduction were no boon to workers. But the most important difference between 
them and the Manchester School arose in where they placed free-trade 
                                                        
15 Katz, ‘The Manifesto and Globalization’, 5. 
16 Frederick Engels, ‘The Free Trade Congress at Brussels’, MECW Vol. 6, 1845-48 (London, 1976), 
283; Engels, ‘The Corn Laws’, (22 Dec. 1842), MECW Vol. 2, 1838-42 (London, 1987), 380-82; W. 
O. Henderson, The Life of Friedrich Engels Volume 1 (London, 1976), 95. 
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internationalism within the stages of capitalist development; Marx and Engels 
considered free trade to be a progressive capitalist stage along the path towards 
eventual socialist revolution, whereas Manchester liberals viewed free trade’s 
universal adoption, and the consequent prosperity and peace that would follow, as the 
final stage of capitalist development. At the geopolitical level, Marx was more 
skeptical than later free-trade socialists concerning the Manchester School premise 
that market interconnectivity derived from trade liberalization would unite the world 
in a fraternity of nations. Marx also thought the ‘squint-eyed set of Manchester 
humbugs’ were hypocritical in condemning war abroad while ignoring the domestic 
war on workers at home.17  
Despite these limits to Marx and Engels’s free-trade internationalism, they 
gave it their support. ‘We are for Free Trade,’ Marx declared to his Brussels audience 
in 1847, because the large-scale internationalization of trade across ‘the territory of 
the whole earth’ would not only connect the world’s markets – it would also help 
unite the world’s proletariat. He also granted that free trade increased productive 
capital, which would increase the demand for labor and thereby further lay the 
groundwork for the proletarian revolution: ‘It breaks up old nationalities and pushes 
the antagonism of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie to the extreme point. In a word, 
the Free Trade system hastens the Social Revolution.’18 While Marx and Engels were 
not certain that free trade would unite the nations of the world, they were confident 
that it would unite the world’s workers. 
                                                        
17 ‘Marx on Free Trade’, 46; Karl Marx, The Eastern Question: A Reprint of Letters Written 1853-
1856 Dealing with the Events of the Crimean War, ed. by Eleanor Marx Aveling and Edward Aveling 
(London and New York, 2013 [1897]), 151; James Joll, ‘The Second International and War’, 
Publications de l’École Française de Rome 54 (1981), 247. 
18 Karl Marx, ‘Speech of Dr. Marx on Protection, Free Trade, and the Working Classes’, Northern Star 
(9 Oct. 1847), reprinted in MECW Vol. 6, 290; Jorge Larrain, ‘Classical Political Economists and Marx 
on Colonialism and ‘Backward’ Nations’, World Development 19 (Feb.-March 1991), 230-231; Alan 
Gilbert, ‘Marx on Internationalism and War’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 7 (Summer 1978): 346-369. 
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While Marx and Engels avoided speculating about an ideal socialist trade 
policy, their internationalist vision of the end of the nation-state after the socialist 
revolution shared much in common with the free-trade vision of the Manchester 
School. After all, for Marx and Engels the end of nation states would have meant the 
end of protectionism between nation states. Manchester School adherents similarly 
envisaged the gradual decline of the nation state, and with it the elimination of 
national rivalries and trade barriers.19 Both intellectual camps therefore overlapped in 
their predictions for the demise of national boundaries and national rivalries, with 
free world trade an end result. 
The hegemonic influence of the Manchester School also helps explain why, in 
the Communist Manifesto and elsewhere in the late 1840s, Marx and Engels directed 
their most scathing critiques upon Germany’s economic nationalist turn to ‘infant 
industrial’ protectionism rather than upon newly minted ‘Free Trade England’. Marx 
charged that, instead of moving capitalism towards socialist revolution, Germany’s 
protectionism was moving it backwards: ‘People are thus about to begin in Germany 
with what people in France and England are about to end. The old corrupt conditions 
against which these countries are rebelling in theory and which they only bear as one 
bears chains, is greeted in Germany as the dawn of a beautiful future.’ Marx singled 
out the protectionist theories of Friedrich List (1789-1846) in particular, while also 
broadly condemning German protectionism and its manipulative call to patriotism for 
allowing the bourgeoisie to ‘exploit his fellow-countrymen.’20 Marx emphasized that 
                                                        
19 Per A. Hammarlund, Liberal Internationalism and the Decline of the State: The Thought of Richard 
Cobden, David Mitrany and Kenichi Ohmae (New York, 2005); Mark Mazower, Governing the 
World: The History of an Idea (New York, 2012), chap. 2. 
20 Italics in the original. Karl Marx, ‘Draft of an Article on Friedrich List’s Book: Das Nationale 
System der Politischen Oekonomie’, MCWE, Vol. 4: Marx and Engels 1844-45 (London, 2010), 275. 
See also Karl Marx, ‘Speech of Dr. Marx on Protection, Free Trade, and the Working 
Classes’, Northern Star (9 Oct. 1847), reprinted in Marx & Engels Collected Works Volume 6: Marx 
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protectionism ‘forcibly’ abbreviated ‘the transition from medieval to the modern 
mode of production,’ and, if allowed to progress naturally, would soon be replaced by 
free trade as the next stage of capitalist development. Engels shared Marx’s criticisms 
of German protectionism.21  
Marx and Engels, again sounding very much like their Manchester School 
contemporaries, considered protectionism harmful to the international system and the 
prime suspect for creating monopolies and trusts. As early as 1842, seven years 
before he moved to London, Marx began to decry protectionism as ‘the organization 
of a state of war in time of peace, a state of war which, aimed in the first place 
against foreign countries, necessarily turns in its implementation against the country 
which organizes it.’22 Engels, though initially more sympathetic to List’s arguments, 
soon came around to Marx’s position, and argued well into the 1880s that the creation 
of monopolies and trusts provided ‘the surest sign that protection has done its work 
and is changing its character.’ Engels denounced protectionism for being  
 
at best an endless screw, and you never know when you have done with 
it. By protecting one industry, you directly or indirectly hurt all others, 
and have therefore to protect them too. By so doing you again damage 
the industry that you first protected, and have to compensate it . . . and so 
on ad infinitum.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
and Engels 1845-48 (London, 2010), 287-290; Roman Szporluk, Communism and Nationalism: Karl 
Marx versus Friedrich List (Oxford, 1988); Radhika Desai, ‘Marx, List, and the Materiality of 
Nations’, Rethinking Marxism 24 (2012): 47-67.  
21 MECW vol. 35, 744; Hollander, Engels and Marxian Political Economy, 132-134. 
22 Marx, ‘Industrialists of Hanover’, MECW Vol. 1, 286; Edmund Silberner, The Problem of War in 
Nineteenth Century Economic Thought (Princeton, 1946), 261-262. 
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The necessary turn ‘to Free Trade is immensely more difficult’ and necessitated a 
‘fight.’ Germany had perverted this order, leading to the rise of trusts and landed 
monopolies.23 Marx and Engels thus gave their pragmatic socialist endorsement to the 
productivity and internationalism that capitalist free trade created: and the eventual 
global proletarian revolution it would help foster.24 Marx and Engels’s socialist focus 
on the stages of capitalist trade policy from the late 1840s onward became even more 
prevalent among turn-of-the-century Marxist theorists, succumbing as they did to the 
cosmopolitan influence of Manchester liberalism.25  
 
II. Free Trade and Socialist Theories of Imperialism 
 
Marx and Engels had undertaken much of their theorizing about the stages of 
capitalism amid an era marked by a brief transatlantic turn to trade liberalization and 
the growing popularity of the Manchester School.26 But this short-lived mid-
nineteenth-century international trend toward freer trade underwent a sharp reversal 
in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Protectionism became the preferred policy 
for developing nations like Germany, the United States, Russia, and Japan as the 
century drew to a close, due in large part to a surge in industrialization and national 
consolidation, coupled with the onset of a series of global economic depressions 
between 1873-96. The List-inspired German Historical School, for example, overtook 
the German imperial government and universities in the 1870s and 1880s to 
                                                        
23 George Lichtheim, Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study (New York, 1961), 216; Frederick 
Engels, preface to the 1888 American edition of Karl Marx’s On the Question of Free Trade, available 
online at https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1888/free-trade/.  
24 Mori Kenzo argues that Marx’s views on free trade changed with respect to some developing 
countries in ‘Marx and “Underdevelopment”: His Thesis on the “Historical Roles of British Free 
Trade” Revisited’, Annals of the Institute of Social Science 19 (1978): 35-61. 
25 Hoselitz, ‘Socialism, Communism, and International Trade’, 227; Howard and King, A History of 
Marxian Economics, Vol. 1, 15-16, 91. 
26 Howe and Morgan, eds., Rethinking Nineteenth-Century Liberalism. 
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counteract the spread of Manchestertum (the German epithet for the Manchester 
School).27 Similarly, in the United States, the Republican Party rebranded itself after 
1865 as the party of economic nationalism and steered US foreign trade policy along 
its protectionist course until the 1930s. Even among Britain’s own settler colonies, 
protectionist policies became entrenched by the turn of the century. While free trade 
kept its hold upon Britain, economic nationalism gripped the developing world, as 
did the monopolistic rise of trusts and cartels and a new wave of Western colonialism 
in Africa, Latin America, and Asia.  
For turn-of-the-century socialist theorists of imperialism like Rudolf 
Hilferding, Vladimir Lenin, Karl Kautsky, and Eduard Bernstein, these protectionist, 
monopolistic, and imperial trends were interrelated. They accordingly honed their 
theories of imperialism from within this evolving Marxist free-trade tradition, and 
updated it to account for the turbulent, protectionist, and militant world order.28 They 
at once critiqued protectionism for being a root cause of monopoly capitalism and 
imperialism – much like contemporary non-Marxist theorists – while at the same time 
they inverted Marx and Engels’s stages of capitalist trade development.  
Austria’s Rudolf Hilferding (1877-1941) like Marx and Engels, favored free 
trade over protectionism. In Finance Capital (1910), Hilferding wrote that 
undoubtedly ‘free trade would amalgamate the whole world market into a single 
economic territory. Free trade would also ensure the highest possible labour 
productivity and the most rational international division of labour.’29 Hilferding also 
                                                        
27 Erik Grimmer-Solem, The Rise of Historical Economics and Social Reform in Germany, 1864-1894 
(New York, 2003); José Luís Cardos and Michalis Psalidopoulos, eds., The German Historical School 
and European Economic Thought (New York, 2016); Keith Tribe, Strategies of Economic Order: 
German Economic Discourse, 1750-1950 (Cambridge, 1995). 
28 Howard and King, A History of Marxian Economics, Vol. 1, chap. 5. 
29 Hilferding, Finance Capital (1910), reprinted in P. J. Cain and Mark Harrison, eds., Imperialism: 
Critical Concepts in Historical Studies Vol. 1 (London, 2001), 227. 
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granted that protectionism, not free trade, went hand-in-hand with imperialism.30 But 
Hilferding broke from Marx and Engels by portraying protectionism as a progressive 
rather than a regressive developmental stage of capitalism: a successor to the mid-
century free-trade epoch rather than its antecedent. Protectionism had created the 
monopolies, the market inefficiencies, the disparities of wealth between rich and 
poor, and the friction between the imperial powers that were now paving the way 
towards the proletarian revolution. The protectionist rise of finance capital and the 
resulting imperial rivalries were now seen as an inevitable step forward in the stages 
of capitalism. In other words, by making protectionism the successor to free trade, 
turn-of-the-century revolutionary theorists of imperialism like Hilferding could claim 
that the twin international rise of protectionism and financial monopolies was the 
latest, or even the highest, stage of capitalism. Hilferding could also claim that the 
need of these same protectionist nations to export surplus capital to new markets and 
to obtain raw materials naturally led to imperial capitalist conflict. His progressive 
placement of protectionism within the capitalist stages was thus a critical point of 
departure for his and subsequent Marxist theories of imperialism. Hilferding’s 
inversion of Marx and Engels’s capitalist stages – of free trade preceding rather than 
succeeding protectionism – and Hilferding’s theory of the cartel tariff thereafter 
reappeared in the work of Russian theorist Vladimir Lenin (1870-1924). 
Lenin’s evolving imperial theory leaned upon Marx, Engels, and Hilferding, 
as well as ‘new’ Manchester liberal J. A. Hobson. Like Marx and Engels, Lenin had 
at first placed free trade as the next progressive stage of capitalism, but came around 
to the stage theory of Hilferding.31 In 1895, Lenin was demanding that ‘Russian 
                                                        
30 Hilferding, Finance Capital; Lichtheim, Marxism, 310-312. 
31 Howard and King, A History of Marxian Economics, Vol. 1, chap. 13. 
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Marxists must stand for free trade, since the reactionary character of protection, 
which retards the country’s economic developments, and serves the interests . . . of a 
handful of all-powerful magnates . . . and since free trade means accelerating the 
process that yields the means of deliverance from capitalism.’32 But by 1916, with the 
world’s empires at war, this free-trade progression fell by the wayside; Lenin now 
asserted that the rest of the industrializing world, ‘sheltering themselves with 
‘protective’ tariffs,’ had undermined Britain’s more pacific free-trade policies. And 
he famously proclaimed the present protectionist monopoly stage to be capitalism’s 
last.33 Lenin’s theory of imperialism was an explicit combination of Marx and 
Manchester. While Lenin admitted to borrowing heavily from Hilferding, he also 
acknowledged his intellectual debt to British Manchester liberal J. A. Hobson, whose 
Imperialism: A Study (1902) condemned the protectionist international system for 
creating the market inefficiencies that led to the imperial search for raw materials and 
new markets for surplus capital. The overlap between their theories was such that it 
has been dubbed the ‘Hobson-Lenin Thesis.’34 
The free-trade sympathies of German socialist imperial theorist and SPD leader 
Karl Kautsky (1854-1938) went even further in combining Manchester liberalism 
with Marxism. Kautsky’s support for free trade remained remarkably consistent, and 
was tied closely to his antipathy towards German protectionism and colonialism.35 
                                                        
32 V. I. Lenin, The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of it in Mr. Struve’s Book (1895), 
in V. I. Lenin: Collected Works Vol. 1 (Moscow, 1971), 441. 
33 Lenin, Imperialism, 71. 
34 V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (Sydney, 1999 [1916]), 111; A. M. 
Eckstein, ‘Is There a “Hobson-Lenin Thesis” on Late Nineteenth-Century Colonial Expansion?’ 
Economic History Review 44 (May 1991): 297-318. On Hobson’s influence on Lenin, see also Brewer, 
Marxist Theories of Imperialism; D. H. Kruger, ‘Hobson, Lenin and Schumpeter on Imperialism’, 
Journal of the History of Ideas 16 (1955): 252-259; John Willoughby, ‘Evaluating the Leninist Theory 
of Imperialism’, Science & Society 59 (Fall 1995): 320-338. 
35 John H. Kautsky, Karl Kautsky: Marxism, Revolution & Democracy (New Brunswick and London, 
1994), 143-44; L. Meldolesi, ‘The Debate on Imperialism Just Before Lenin’, Economic and Political 
Weekly 19 (20-27 Oct. 1984): 1833-1839. 
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His time spent in London from 1885 to 1890 proved formative, leading to a close 
relationship with Friedrich Engels, as well as an intellectual infatuation with the 
Manchester School.36 His association of ‘industrial capitalism’ with free trade, peace, 
and progress — and protectionism with pre-industrialism and militarism — reflected 
the theories of non-Marxist contemporaries like Hobson and Joseph Schumpeter.37 
Right around the same time as Hobson was penning Imperialism, Kautsky was 
drawing similar inspiration from what he perceived as the decline of Manchester 
liberalism in Britain, resulting in the outbreak of the second Boer War (1899-1902). 
‘Manchester ideals’ were being ‘pushed into the background by Imperialism,’ 
Kautsky wrote in 1900, thereby increasing ‘the power of militarism.’ And like 
Hobson, he observed how colonialism after 1870 followed from the search for new 
markets as outlets for surplus goods and capital – surpluses wrought from inefficient 
protectionist policies. ‘The higher the tariff barriers between individual capitalist 
states grow, the more each of them feels the need to assure itself of a market which 
no one can exclude them from, and to gain supplies of raw material which no one can 
cut off,’ thereby creating an ‘arms race’ that ‘must grow ever greater and the danger 
of a world war come ever nearer.’ In his 1914 article ‘Ultra-imperialism,’ he 
associated free trade with peace and industrial capitalism, and contrasted them with 
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the connection between protectionism, cartels, financial capitalism, and the 
consequent need to export surplus capital: ‘the principal roots of imperialism’ that 
had ‘replaced free trade.’38 Kautsky therefore roundly condemned colonialism 
derived from protectionism.39 Kautsky’s Marx-Manchester ideology also informed 
his belief that European trade liberalization could only maintain peace through 
supranational governance. He argued that a free-trading ‘United States of Europe’ 
would ‘ban the spectre of war.’40 Kautsky’s support for free trade, supranational 
governance, and peace—positions scholars more commonly associate with interwar 
‘neoliberal’ intellectuals—continued to influence the SPD in the interwar years and 
beyond.41 
Eduard Bernstein, an SPD spokesman on foreign policy and taxation issues in 
the German Reichstag from 1902-28, even more than Kautsky epitomized the 
confluence of Manchestertum and Marxism in Germany.42 Bernstein’s formative 
years of exile in London (1888-1901) placed him at the center of turn-of-the-century 
Marxist and Manchester School radicalism. Bernstein’s time in England, rubbing 
shoulders with Kautsky, Engels, and the Fabians, as well as Cobdenites like Hobson, 
had a profound influence upon his later socialist free-trade internationalism.43 
Manfred Steger has gone so far as to state that Bernstein fell ‘under the influence of 
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both Engels and the British free-trade tradition.’44 Like Kautsky, Bernstein was 
consistent in his support for free trade over the course of his socialist political career. 
Bernstein believed free trade was not only progressive but also good for both the 
proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Also like Kautsky (and Marx), Bernstein condemned 
List-inspired ‘infant industrial’ protectionism for creating geopolitical tensions and 
for being reactionary and atavistic, a throwback to the era of mercantilism and a 
stumbling block to modernization. His critique of militarism – for which he blamed 
jingoism, nationalism, protectionism, and the undue influence of arms manufacturers 
on German policymaking — owed much to the influence of later Engels. And like 
Kautsky, Bernstein’s critique shared much in common with Hobson and Schumpeter, 
as did his belief that free trade and industrialism were the foundation stones of a 
peaceful economic order, such that R. A. Fletcher posits that Bernstein was ‘not only 
fundamentally more British than German but also thoroughly imbued with the values 
of Cobdenite radicalism.’45 Bernstein’s Marx-Manchester free-trade beliefs would 
find wide-ranging subscribers among early-twentieth-century socialist 
internationalists.46  
 
III. Socialist Free-Trade-and-Peace Activism, c. 1880-1918 
 
Socialist free-trade-and-peace activism grew substantially between the turn of the 
century and the end of the First World War, a period that uncoincidentally also saw 
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the growth of protectionism, monopolies, and colonial expansion. In contrast to the 
rest of the industrializing world, within turn-of-the-century Britain, free trade had 
evolved into a cause, and Richard Cobden a popular hero, among the working class. 
Socialist leaders of the British trade union movement and the Independent Labour 
Party (ILP) remained supportive of the Manchester School’s belief that free trade 
mollified geopolitical conflict, owing to the decades-long relationship between the 
nation’s working class and Liberal radicals. 47 ‘ILP’s internationalism,’ Paul Bridgen 
observes, ‘was influenced more by the nineteenth-century liberal internationalist 
campaigns of Cobden and Gladstone than by the anti-national internationalism of 
socialism.’48  
German socialist internationalists, imbued with their own Marx-Manchester-
inspired notions, appear to have been even more proactive than their British 
counterparts amid their opposition to Germany’s protectionist imperial government. 
By 1879, a unified German state had turned to an economic nationalist program of 
infant industrial protectionism along lines first laid out by Friedrich List in the 1840s, 
which Marx had previously condemned as retrograde in the capitalist stages of 
development. From the 1890s, opposition SPD leaders like Engels, Kautsky, 
Bernstein, Zietz, and Bebel began advocating instead for free trade in their struggle 
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against the avowedly anti-Manchestertum protectionist policies of the German 
Historical School and Wilhelm’s imperial government.49 As in Edwardian Britain, 
albeit with less success, the German socialist fight for free trade promised to provide 
cheap food for the working class and to undermine the power of the landed elite (the 
Junckers), the nation’s foremost imperial protectionists. As a result, by 1902 the SPD 
even found themselves allied with the country’s sidelined liberal Progressives. ‘The 
link between them,’ George Lichtheim notes, ‘was of course free trade.’50  
Germany’s Marx-Manchester free traders were thereafter instrumental in 
shaping the free-trade-and-peace programs of the international socialist congresses in 
Copenhagen (1910) and Basel (1912). Both programs foreshadowed Woodrow 
Wilson’s subsequent Fourteen Points, including a call for ‘no economic war after the 
war . . . freedom of the seas . . . and the most rapid possible extension of the policy of 
free trade in the colonies as well as in the home land.’ At the 1912 congress, Bebel 
and Kautsky received support from Bebel’s new SPD co-chairman, Hugo Haase, who 
observed that ‘economic interdependence constitutes a force that restricts belligerent 
agitators.’ Bernstein, in turn, called for a ‘protest against protectionism, a 
demonstration in favor of peace, freedom, and free trade.’51 Just a month into the 
First World War, Kautsky accordingly laid out three principles for socialist 
internationalists to support in any peace negotiations that exemplified the evolving 
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Marx-Manchester tradition: ‘(1) The freedom of subject races of nationalities, (2) 
Steps towards disarmament, and (3) Steps towards world-wide free trade.’ As one 
American socialist described the latter proposal, Kautsky’s vision was ‘a world-wide 
economic interdependence of nations that would soon bring it about that wars would 
be neither economically desirable nor economically feasible.’52 
Kautsky’s cosmopolitan vision bore an uncanny likeness to that laid out just a 
handful of years earlier by Manchester School journalist Norman Angell, who had 
argued that war was economically futile owing to the era’s unprecedented global 
market interdependence in his international bestselling book The Great Illusion 
(1910). The similarity between Kautsky and Angell’s arguments was doubtless more 
than coincidental. In 1913 German pacifists had made sure to distribute 2,000 
German translations of Angell’s book (Illusion, Die Falsche Rechnung), as well as 
40,000 fifteen-page pamphlets containing its key arguments, in advance of Angell’s 
notorious speaking tour of German universities.53  
As the world war progressed, more and more international peace activists, 
Marxist and non-Marxist alike, envisaged a more peaceful economically 
interdependent postwar world. The 1916 Socialist Peace Conference held at The 
Hague — which included delegates from Spain, the United States, Denmark, Sweden, 
Argentina, and Holland — adopted resolutions ‘condemning an economic war after 
the war and favoring free trade and freedom of the seas.’54 And the mixture of 
Manchester liberal and Marxist attendees of the First American Conference for 
Democracy and Peace in 1917 at New York’s Madison Square Garden drew attention 
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to how their shared belief in free trade and peace had brought them together. Morris 
Hillquit, the international secretary of the Socialist Party of America, reported on the 
endorsement of worldwide ‘freedom of commerce’ from the conference’s Committee 
on Peace. ‘We are trading in a world market. Economically and commercially, it is 
one,’ and yet ‘people have tried to parcel out this world into rigid nations or countries 
with rigid boundary lines, separated from each other by various and conflicting 
treaties and customs, duties and other artificial restrictions’ that ultimately led to 
world war.55  
 Such activism became a groundswell between 1917 and 1918, owing in large 
part to Wilson’s Manchester School-inspired Fourteen Points and the newly 
announced peace program of the Soviet government. In Britain, the 1917 National 
Labour Conference held in Manchester gave its socialist backing to Woodrow 
Wilson’s ‘international league for peace,’ and passed its own resolution demanding 
‘free trade for every country.’56 The following year, Max Eastman, with his sister 
Crystal Eastman, began co-editing the American communist magazine the Liberator. 
Max, ‘as an international socialist, welcomed Wilson’s “Program of the World’s 
Peace,”’ including its support for ‘renouncing economic war on Germany’ and ‘free-
trade and the principle of the open door everywhere.’57 In early 1918, the National 
Executive Council of the Socialist Party of America issued a memorial to Wilson, 
giving its unreserved anti-imperial endorsement to ‘the peace program of the Russian 
Socialist government,’ which included a call for freedom of the seas and ‘full equality 
of trade conditions among all nations,’ and asked Wilson to take part in the Russian-
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Central Powers peace conference.58 The 1918 Congressional Program of the Socialist 
Party similarly echoed the Soviet government’s peace program, while adding ‘to the 
famous formula. . . . ‘No economic nationalism, no war after the war.’’59 Lacking the 
context of the Marx-Manchester free-trade tradition, such international socialist 
support for Wilson’s Manchester liberal economic vision might seem striking. After 
all, there was no love lost between US socialists and the Wilson Administration, 
which had persecuted, censored, and even jailed them during the war.60 And yet their 
shared internationalist vision of a postwar world of free trade and peace allowed them 
to transcend their mutual antagonism. 
Socialist free-trade-and-peace activism increasingly became one of 
international collaboration. With radical socialist academic Scott Nearing presiding, 
Harlem’s 1918 National Conference of Labor, Socialist, and Radical Movements 
developed a peace program demanding self-determination, disarmament, freedom of 
the seas, free migration, and that ‘free trade should prevail.’ The program was then 
sent to Germany, Italy, France, and England for ‘approval and support.’61 Nearing, an 
officer of the Boston-based peace organization the International Free Trade League 
(IFTL), also made sure to send a copy of the Harlem program to IFTL president 
Frank Wright Garrison, a grandson of Boston’s mid-nineteenth-century arch-
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abolitionist Cobdenite William Lloyd Garrison. Frank shared his family’s radical 
progressive position on social and economic issues. A fervent non-Marxist disciple of 
Henry George and Richard Cobden, Frank nevertheless gave Nearing’s socialist 
program his blessing, owing to the fact that ‘economic freedom heads the list and is 
thoroughly sound and uncompromising.’62 Just half a year later in London, similar 
socialist motions were made at the Inter-Allied Labor Conference. The conference 
roundly condemned (1) ‘the colonial policy of capitalist Governments’; (2) 
‘economic aggression, whether by protective tariffs or capitalist trusts or 
monopolies’; and (3) ‘the alliance between the Military Imperialists and the Fiscal 
Protectionists in any country whatsoever’ as a ‘grave menace to peace’ and to the 
prosperity of the working class.63   
The rapidly expanding Marx-Manchester tradition, however, did not maintain a 
complete monopoly on late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century socialist thought. 
Although less prominent at this time, what might be called a Marx-List tradition was 
evolving alongside it. German-American protectionist theorist Friedrich List had 
argued in his influential book The National System of Political Economy (1841) that 
developing nations’ infant industries required a combination of colonialism and 
protectionism to catch up to more advanced states like mid-nineteenth-century 
Britain; universal free trade ought to occur only once worldwide developmental 
parity was achieved at some undefined point down the road. List’s protectionist 
theory was a critique of British free-trade imperialism. But it also issued a 
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protectionist call for colonial expansion among developing states like Germany and 
the United States, which List believed needed to acquire raw materials and captive 
protective markets to invest their surplus capital.64 
Despite Marx’s own strong criticisms of List’s theories, some more 
nationalistic socialists ended up drawing on his ideas to bolster their nations’ 
protectionist imperial policies. When Britain adopted free trade in the 1840s, for 
example, numerous nationally-focused French socialists disavowed free trade owing 
both to the longstanding rivalry between the two countries and to the growing 
influence of List’s Anglophobic theories within French politics.65 In turn-of-the-
century Britain, Fabian socialists like George Bernard Shaw were throwing their 
support behind protectionism and British imperial expansion.66 Although a free-trade 
utopian in the 1880s while under the influence of American Cobdenite Henry George, 
by 1904 Shaw sought to counter the British socialist predilection for free trade by 
insisting that British socialism was ‘ultra-Protectionist’ and required imperial 
federation to obtain social reform.67 British Clarion socialists, even more than 
Fabian’s like Shaw, viewed foreign trade as a zero-sum game. By 1910 the Clarion 
socialists began running a strong pro-Tariff Reform campaign assailing ‘The Liberal-
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Free Trade-Labour Party.’68 Attempts were also made in Germany to wed List’s ideas 
to the SPD. Along Listian and Lassallian lines, the SPD’s minority cohort of Marxist 
protectionists like Paul Lensch gave their nationalistic stamp of approval to German 
imperial expansion.69  
In quite different economic imperial contexts, some turn-of-the-century Indian 
anti-colonial nationalists also began turning to a combination of Marx and List for 
inspiration. The key difference arose in that, whereas the British settler colonies were 
granted fiscal autonomy, India was forced to keep its tariffs low and to produce raw 
materials for British manufacturers, to the detriment of India’s own industrial 
development. Second, where socialist nationalists in France, Germany, and Britain 
embraced List’s protectionist call for colonizing undeveloped states, List’s Indian 
disciples focused upon his critique of British free-trade imperialism.70 This anti-
colonial strand of the Marx-List tradition, to which Manu Goswami has redrawn 
attention, would resurface in an even bigger way after 1945 among nationalists 
throughout the Global South. But in the decades immediately following the First 
World War, advocacy of this Marx-List tradition remained the exception to what was 
fast becoming the Marx-Manchester rule. 
 
IV. Marx-Manchester Free-Trade Internationalism, c. 1919-1946  
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Interwar Europe became a breeding ground of socialist free-trade-and-peace activity, 
maintained and regulated, they argued, through a league of nations. Socialist 
intellectuals like Albert Einstein thought of free trade as a peace movement.71 In 
order to create a more peaceful geopolitical order, the socialist parties of France, 
Germany, Austria, Britain, and Hungary came out in support of international freedom 
of the seas and freedom of trade in 1919. That year’s International Socialist Congress 
in Berne also endorsed these pacific free-trade positions, coupled with ‘the Socialist 
ideal of a League of Nations’ endowed with the power to regulate interstate trade and 
to control ‘world thoroughfares’ and ‘the production and distribution of foodstuffs 
and raw materials throughout the world.’72 The Marx-Manchester association of 
protectionist monopolies with the imperial search for new markets and natural 
resources meant that they saw no contradiction in calling for universal free trade 
alongside supranational regulation and distribution of raw materials; both were 
deemed necessary to undermine the economic foundations of colonialism and 
militarism. 
Boston feminist Crystal Eastman and her brother Max played a key part in 
entwining the US socialist, free trade, and peace movements through their Marxist 
magazine the Liberator. Crystal Eastman took the opportunity as co-editor to spread 
the word about the newly formed IFTL (like Nearing, she was an IFTL officer), 
placing a full-page advert immediately after the front-page visage of Lenin in the 
January 1919 issue. Along clear Cobdenite lines of argument, the advert made sure to 
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stress the connection between free trade and peace. Free trade was the ‘only secure 
foundation’ for the League of Nations. Free trade’s panacea would also end the 
colonial question, protect small nations, end militarism, provide cheap goods, lower 
the cost of living, create global prosperity, and establish permanent peace. 
‘International Free Trade’ therefore must be ‘incorporated in the Peace Treaty as 
repeatedly recommended by (1) President Wilson, (2) the British Labor Party, (3) the 
German Reichstag, (4) the Russian People’s Government, and (5) Socialists 
everywhere.’73 
The Western embargo of the new Soviet government from 1919-21 also 
became a hot-button issue for socialist free traders. IFTL officer Ludwig Martens, the 
Soviet Government’s official representative to the United States between 1917-21, 
with the assistance of Santeri Nuorteva – a Finnish Marxist politician, journalist, and 
fellow IFTL officer — worked hard to obtain US loans and end the embargo from 
their Soviet Bureau offices in New York. Under the suspicious watch of the US 
Government, their organization’s Marxist publication Soviet Russia began 
propagandizing how normalization of trade would make ‘a real peace’ and alleviate 
the mass starvation of Eastern Europe.74  
 Socialist free traders in interwar Britain wielded considerable influence in 
national and international politics and were among the country’s lead defenders of 
Manchester liberalism. While some heterodox British socialists supported 
protectionism and imperialism, the Labour Party itself remained a melting pot of 
socialist and Manchester liberal economic ideas. As Frank Trentmann notes, Labour 
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inherited the Liberal radical ‘belief that trade promoted the brotherhood of man by 
breaking down the walls of insular prejudice and chauvinism associated with 
protectionist imperialism’: a ‘socialist-radical dualism.’ Leading Manchester liberal 
internationalists, including Norman Angell, J. A. Hobson, H. N. Brailsford, and 
Bertrand Russell, had associated themselves more strongly with progressive social 
reform during the Edwardian period – New Liberalism – helping to pave the way for 
Labour’s postwar popularity.75 Owing in no small part to this confluence of ‘new’ 
Manchester liberalism with Labour socialism, opposition to protectionism remained a 
key part of British socialist peace activism well into the 1930s and 1940s. The first 
position the Labour Party laid out in its 1923 manifesto was an indictment of 
protectionism ‘and the whole conception of economic relations underlying it.’76 
Following the National Government’s abandonment of free trade for imperial 
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preference in 1932, Labour’s 1934 publication For Socialism and Peace attacked ‘the 
disastrous economic nationalism of the present age by working for an all-round 
lowering of tariffs’ through ‘a system of planned international exchange.’ Labour’s 
support for a domestic planned economy in the early 1940s, in turn, was coupled with 
a call for a supranational body that would oversee a new era of multilateral free-trade 
agreements and international control of raw materials.77 
More and more international socialist organizations in interwar Europe also 
began giving their pacific free-trade blessing to supranational governance. The 
Labour and Socialist International (LSI), the more inclusive rival of the Comintern, 
looked for a middle way between Marxism and liberal radicalism in its search for 
peace.78 Revitalized in 1923, the LSI called for ‘permanent peace’; supported the 
League of Nations; condemned capitalist imperialism; and demanded that ‘labour 
must also fight against protectionism and in favour of free trade’ and the free 
movement of people. The socialist International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU, 
1919-1945), an avowed peace organization based in Amsterdam with close ties to the 
LSI, likewise endorsed universal free trade and the liberal internationalist vision 
embodied in the League of Nations.79 
The Marx-Manchester peace movement received an interwar boost from the 
resurgent international co-operative movement, which advocated for an economic 
‘third way’ situated between individualism and collectivism, and between liberal 
reform and socialist revolution. The international co-operative movement had come a 
                                                        
77 Labour Party, For Socialism and Peace (London, 1934), 8-9, 11; Richard Toye, The Labour Party 
and the Planned Economy, 1931-1951 (London, 2003), 158-162. 
78 Daniel Laqua, ‘Democratic Politics and the League of Nations: Labour and Socialist International as 
a Protagonist of Interwar Internationalism’, Contemporary European History 24 (May 2015), 192. 
79 Resolutions of the International Labour Congress of Socialist Parties, Hamburg 1923, pp. 7, 14, 16-
17; J. W. Brown, ‘The International Trade Union Movement’, Journal of the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 7 (Jan. 1928): 29-41; Laqua, ‘Democratic Politics and the League of Nations.’ 
 30 
long way from its modest origins in 1840s Rochdale, England, a town with strong 
Cobdenite roots.80 By the 1920s, the movement’s umbrella organization, the 
International Co-operative Alliance (ICA), rivaled the international trade union 
movement as the interwar world’s largest transnational non-governmental 
organization.81 Its peaceful economic vision was a social democratic one focused 
upon a grassroots, not-for-profit, working-class version of free trade that would 
empower the world’s consumers and local producers alike. To accomplish this and to 
undermine international trusts and cartels, co-operative free trade also called for 
supranational control over the global distribution of food and raw materials through 
the League of Nations.82  
The predominant interwar international co-operative movement embodied the 
Marx-Manchester ideological paradigm in its grassroots efforts to promote worldwide 
prosperity and peace through co-operative free trade. The Women’s Co-operative 
Guild (WCG, 1893), a feminist peace organization that maintained close ties to the 
British Labour Party, had given its formal endorsement to free trade by the turn of the 
century, pointing its members to the free-trade activism of socialist workers in 
Germany for inspiration.83 The ICA had embraced pacifism a bit later than the WCG, 
endorsing peace and world federalism in 1913 in the hopes of stopping the world war 
before it began.84 At war’s end, the ICA drew up a memorandum to send to the Paris 
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Peace Conference that connected peace with a League of Nations that embraced co-
operative free trade.85 The co-operative movement remained prominent within the 
interwar peace movement, keeping up its League of Nations lobbying campaign on 
behalf of its particular brand of Marx-Manchester free trade.86  
By the end of the 1920s, however, rifts had begun to develop between the 
international co-operative movement’s more moderate socialist majority and the more 
radical representatives of the Soviet co-operatives, who instead saw cooperation as a 
means to socialist revolution.87 The latter expressed their disappointment that the ICA 
had failed to explicitly endorse the principle of class struggle. They also criticized 
ICA leaders for continuing to seek co-operative free-trade-and-peace reforms through 
the liberal capitalist League of Nations. The Soviet members instead argued that, as 
Katarina Friberg puts it, ‘only the “United States of the Soviet Republics” could 
achieve real free trade.’88 For Soviet advocates of ‘real free trade’ like the 
cooperatives and Lenin himself, the meaning of the term itself was transforming into 
an economic policy to be practiced only between socialist planned economies rather 
than between all the world’s producers and consumers as advocated by the era’s 
Marx-Manchester international disciples. 
The world economic crisis of the 1930s and the consequent global turn to 
economic autarky, nationalism, and imperial consolidation only reaffirmed the Marx-
Manchester tradition for its socialist internationalist subscribers. They continued to 
connect protectionism with imperialism and militarism, and free-trade 
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internationalism with peace. The SPD’s Rudolf Hilferding, recently removed from his 
position as Germany’s minister of finance, wrote in 1931 in favor of international co-
operation under the auspices of the League of Nations’s International Labour 
Organization in order to substitute the ‘chaos wrought by economic nationalism with 
a well-planned order’ of global exchange.89 Even as Britain itself was abandoning its 
long-held free-trade orthodoxy for imperial trade preference and the Soviet Union 
was becoming ever more closed off, the Executive Committee of the Comintern 
explained at its 1932 meeting in Moscow knew where to lay the brunt of the blame: 
‘The fierce struggle the imperialists are waging for markets and colonies, the tariff 
wars and the race for armaments, have already led to the immediate danger of a new 
imperialist world war.’90 A similar refrain was heard from the 2,196 socialists from 
India, China, Japan, the Balkans, South America, the United States, and Western 
Europe — claiming to represent 30,000 organizations and 30,000,000 workers of the 
world — that attended the World Congress Against War in Amsterdam in 1932. Its 
manifesto blamed the protectionist measures ‘adopted under the pressure of the 
economic crisis’ for deepening it and for rendering ‘inevitable the transformation of 
economic rivalry into armed conflict.’91 The international co-operative movement 
also mobilized on behalf of free trade and peace throughout the 1930s.92 
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Owing to the growing economic nationalist trend across the globe, socialist 
internationalist supporters of free trade found themselves increasingly at odds not 
only with the capitalist powers of the West, but also with the ostracized Soviet east, 
as its foreign trade became ever more autarkic under Stalin’s autocratic ‘socialism in 
one country’ rule. Kautsky, for example, admonished the Soviet monopoly of foreign 
trade, arguing that the latest economic nationalist uptick was contributing to the 
growth of fascism.93 In contrast to the Soviet Union, socialist internationalists in 
Germany and France sought instead to toe the free-trade-and-peace line, including 
supporting liberal capitalist supranational organizations to oversee its regulation. 
Germany’s SPD and the French Socialist Party, according to Brian Shaev, ‘became 
the largest political forces in their countries committed to liberalising international 
trade.’94 And in 1943, while the Second World War raged, the French Socialist Party 
became adamant in calling for a ‘United States of Europe’ as a necessary first step 
towards a ‘United States of the World,’ empowered with the ability to regulate and 
monitor customs tariffs.95 
Just a year before, however, Vienna-born Marxist intellectual Franz Borkenau 
had criticized the pervasive Marx-Manchester vision for a global economic order of 
supranational governance, free trade, and peace. In Socialism: Nationalism or 
Internationalism (1942), written from London, he argued that internationalism was 
‘not socialist but a liberal ideal, borrowed by socialists from the liberals of their age.’ 
Marx himself had ‘carried the convictions and the prejudices of the liberal age into 
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the labour movement. It is now necessary to say that the Marxists were as ready to 
carry into the labour movement the convictions and the prejudices of the bourgeoisie 
of a later day.’ For Borkenau, the Marx-Manchester panacea of a new economic order 
based upon ‘international free trade and international planning, absolute self-
determination of nations and federal union to the exclusion of all sovereignties’ was a 
pipedream. He also discounted the ‘Hobson-Hilferding-Lenin’ theory of imperialism; 
its association of protectionist monopoly capitalism with imperial expansion was but 
‘more proof of the overwhelming influence of liberalism upon early socialism.’ 
Socialist ‘neo-liberal utopians, of the Federal Union type’ were similarly mistaken in 
seeking to devise an equitable and democratic ‘second, “more efficient” edition of the 
League of Nations’ for governing a new age of free trade and peace. Soviet Russia’s 
embrace of economic nationalism, the worldwide turn to fascism and autarky after 
the Great Depression, the unequal levels of global economic development, and 
worldwide racial conflict all proved such ‘utopian’ socialist internationalist dreams 
delusional.96 
Just such a Marx-Manchester ‘utopian’ planned supranational vision of free 
trade and peace prevailed not only among European socialist federal unionists, but 
also among socialist internationalists in 1930s and 1940s America. Under the political 
and intellectual leadership of Norman Thomas and Scott Nearing, American socialists 
renewed their Marx-Manchester commitments in response to the Great Depression 
and continued Republican protectionism. Thomas — a prominent interwar pacifist 
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and anti-imperialist, and the Socialist Party’s six-time presidential nominee between 
1928-48  — believed that the only way to end war was to reform the world economic 
system through a combination of Cobdenism, international socialism, co-operativism, 
and supranational regulation of food and raw materials.97 Under his leadership, the 
Socialist Party of America made sure to single out the GOP’s protectionist 1930 
Smoot-Hawley Tariff, calling it ‘the most monstrous tariff legislation in the history of 
the country. . . . It has, in effect, declared economic war against the rest of the world 
and served to aggravate the instability of world economy and world trade.’98 Nearing 
took to task not only US protectionism, but also the European turn to autarky and 
fascism. ‘Theory denies the possibility of economically self-sufficient twentieth 
century nations. But fascists are not concerned with theory . . . they propose to make 
autarchy work.’99 Western Europe, he argued, ‘builds the frontiers of each nation 
every higher, with tariffs, subsidies, quotas, immigration prohibitions. . . . The pursuit 
of this autarchic goal is driving West Europe steadily toward’ economic sectionalism, 
militarism, and geopolitical conflict.100 The Socialist Party of America’s advocacy of 
free trade remained a key ingredient of its peace program well into the postwar years, 
as did various other socialist parties in Europe seeking regional and international 
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What would become a widespread early- to mid-twentieth-century socialist 
internationalist belief that free trade was a prerequisite for world peace originated in 
1840s Britain, amid the heyday of Manchester liberalism. Building on Marx and 
Engels’s qualified mid-nineteenth-century endorsement of free trade, socialist 
internationalists thereafter borrowed from, inspired, and at times even worked 
alongside capitalist disciples of Manchester liberalism owing to their shared desire to 
overturn the militant economic nationalist world order that prevailed over the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, they also 
shared a similar belief that supranational governance would be needed to regulate and 
maintain a freer, more peaceful, and interdependent global marketplace: a vision for a 
new international economic order that informed the post-1945 globalization projects 
of the capitalist West, the socialist East, and the Global South.102 On the eve of the 
Cold War, socialist internationalists continued to draw upon a free-trade tradition that 
shared a common heritage with that of the mid-twentieth-century capitalist heirs of 
Manchester liberalism. As a result, both camps supported the shaping of a new 
economic cosmopolitan order. However, whether the peace and prosperity wrought 
from worldwide free trade was the desired end goal in itself — as it was for 
Manchester School capitalists like Cordell Hull and Friedrich Hayek — or whether 
this was seen as the next peaceful step towards a socialist global order remained the 
point of essential divergence. 
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